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In the light of the urgency raised by the COVID-19 pan-
demic, global investment in wildlife virology is likely to
increase, and new surveillance programmes will identify
hundreds of novel viruses that might someday pose a
threat to humans. To support the extensive task of labora-
tory characterization, scientists may increasingly rely on
data-driven rubrics or machine learning models that
learn from known zoonoses to identify which animal
pathogens could someday pose a threat to global health.
We synthesize the findings of an interdisciplinary
workshop on zoonotic risk technologies to answer the fol-
lowing questions. What are the prerequisites, in terms of
open data, equity and interdisciplinary collaboration, to
the development and application of those tools? What
effect could the technology have on global health? Who
would control that technology, who would have access
to it and who would benefit from it? Would it improve
pandemic prevention? Could it create new challenges?
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Infectious
disease macroecology: parasite diversity and dynamics
across the globe’.1. Introduction
After the COVID-19 pandemic ends—or even before [1]—the
world will face another emergence of a heretofore-unknown
epidemic or pandemic threat, which will most likely be a
novel zoonotic virus. This is less a testament to the state of
global health, and more a basic consequence of arithmetic:
as many as one in every five known mammalian viruses
has the ability to make the jump into human populations,
and only an estimated 1% of mammal viruses are currently
known to science [2,3]. For example, a whole constellation
of distinct SARS-related coronaviruses circulate in bats and
in China and Southeast Asia [4,5], and at least two-thirds of
reservoirs might still be unidentified [6]. However, even the
most intensively studied viruses and well-sampled hosts
can harbour undiscovered diversity: influenza A viruses are
perhaps the most widely agreed upon future pandemic
threat [7–9], but novel strains emerging through reassortment
in wildlife and livestock are often only noted once they reach
or cross the animal–human interface. Despite the urgency of
research on zoonotic emergence, the diversity and rapid evol-
ution of viruses poses a problem of scale for actionable
science (figure 1).
The next zoonotic threat might be unfamiliar to virologists,
but more likely than not, it will bear at least some similarity
to previous counterparts. A handful of viral clades make the
zoonotic jump most often, and are more likely to continue
spreading within human populations [10–12]. As a result,
novel zoonotic epidemics often harken back to previous
outbreaks: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) shares 76% of its genome with SARS-CoV,
and much of its pathology [13]; the emergence of HIV-1
groupM in the 1920s was followed by a dozen more spilloversof similar primate viruses, including the progenitor of HIV-2
[14–16]; and the emergence of filoviruses with Marburg
virus in 1967 was followed almost a decade later by the
first Sudan ebolavirus and Zaire ebolavirus outbreaks, both in
1976 [17].
Though these instances are anecdotal and few in number,
similarities between emergence events across time and space
point to the widely accepted idea that while individual out-
breaks are idiosyncratic and (as standalone stochastic events)
unpredictable, they often follow predictable patterns, which
might constitute the raw materials for a zoonotic risk assess-
ment procedure—defining, for example, the virus species,
conditions or locations with a greater risk of causing or experi-
encing these events [18,19]. For example, a 2017 study, which
aimed to predict risk factors for future coronavirus emergence,
used a regression model to show that wildlife markets
predicted higher coronavirus positivity rates in bats; used
another model to estimate hundreds of coronaviruses might
still be undiscovered and used a mapping approach to predict
most undiscovered sarbecoviruses would be found in southern
China and southeast Asia [20]. These predictions have been
reasonably prescient, given the likely origins of SARS-CoV-2
in the southeast Asian peninsula through wildlife farming or
trade 3 years later. Another study used simple models of
viral sharing networks to predict that ferret badgers might
have been a likely bridge host in the emergence of SARS-
CoV-2 a year before the species was flagged by the World
Health Organization origins investigation [6]. Though these
approaches might not allow scientists to predict exactly
where and when the next outbreak will begin, they allow a
different kind of prediction, one focused on exploring and
explaining biological possibility and socioecological risk
factors with an eye towards future threats.
As zoonotic viruses and their non-human animal (here-
after animal) hosts become better characterized, a growing
library of virological data is becoming increasingly available
and accessible to the scientific community, putting this risk
assessment procedure within reach for the first time. This is
increasingly possible with the growing application of machine
learning to risk assessment problems. Zoonotic origins are
often described as a sequential process, in which pathogens
must pass through a series of biological, ecological and
social filters that would otherwise prevent their emergence
[21,22]. At each of these steps, machine learning has been suc-
cessfully and reliably applied to predict the animal origins of a
novel zoonosis [23,24], the potential hosts of undiscovered
zoonoses [6,25], the ecological and anthropogenic risk factors
for zoonotic spillover [26,27], the ability of novel viruses to
infect humans [28] and their ability to transmit onwards in
human populations [10,29]. Such models have also been
used to predict the severity of disease [30], and may be
extended to predict mortality in the future [29,31]. These
methods have been particularly useful when they can harness
the genomic signatures of host adaptation and compatibility
[23,32], as for many viruses, this may be the only available
data [33].
Here, we focus on a subset of this emerging set of
methods, which we term zoonotic risk technology and define
as an informatic system, statistical model or artificial intelli-
gence that identifies at least one of two viral traits we term
zoonotic potential (which we define as the ability of an
animal virus to infect a human host) and epidemic potential








































Figure 1. Zoonotic risk technology can be part of a broader scientific pipeline that connects viral discovery and wildlife disease surveillance to the development of





transmit onwards in human populations). In calling these
tools ‘zoonotic risk technology’, we aim to encompass a
wider range of systems than just predictive models (e.g. infor-
matic systems like databases that report risk factors for
emergence based on expert opinion) and that could extend
beyond them (e.g. the physical machines that can store
these tools or would allow their deployment in field settings).
More importantly, by considering these tools as a kind of
emerging technology, we aim not to imply anything about
the scientific validity or value of the tools, but instead
to focus attention on their user base, implementation and
effects on broader human systems. This set of approaches
has a necessarily narrowly defined scope, which does not
encompass every component of ‘risk’. For example, machine
learning algorithms can also be applied to predict zoonotic
isolates of bacteria [34,35], and similar models can be applied
to identify potential wildlife reservoirs or arthropod vectors
of zoonoses [25,36,37]. Similarly, spatio-temporal patterns of
viral dynamics in livestock and wildlife reservoirs are a criti-
cal missing piece in many spillover risk assessments [38–40].
After a transmissible pathogen reaches human hosts, yet
another set of virological, social, economic and political
factors determine whether a spillover event becomes an
epidemic or pandemic [41–44]. However, we focus on the
narrowly defined idea of zoonotic risk technology as a way
to operationalize a specific set of existing approaches to facili-
tate the identification of viruses with zoonotic potential, and
to interrogate the potential value of these technologies to
global health.
To facilitate discussion on these topics, we held a one-day
digital workshop (the ‘Verena Forum on Zoonotic Risk Tech-
nology’) at the Georgetown University Center for Global
Health Science and Security in January 2021. This setting
allowed scientists to present cutting-edge computational
and laboratory approaches, and to discuss potential appli-
cations or challenges with global health practitioners, with
a focus on equity concerns in data sharing and technology
deployment. Here, we report a brief synthesis of our findings.
Zoonotic risk technologies are no longer hypothetical,
and are rapidly emerging as practical, concrete applications
of scientific knowledge. These tools are part of the broader
predictive toolkit in viral ecology, and like other kinds of pre-
dictive models, they are imperfect. Here, we identify three
major barriers to actionable science that researchers must
consider further:(i) Technologies will have the most value to global health
if they are treated as part of the process of characteriz-
ing risk, rather than the singular endpoint. Additional
work is required to validate predictions, such as lab-
oratory investigations, but may be expensive at-scale
and potentially politically sensitive.
(ii) Academic publishing alone is insufficient to enable the
deployment of tools in surveillance programmes
or rapid outbreak response scenarios; user-friendly,
open-source tools must be coupled with global capacity
building in risk analyses and mitigation.
(iii) The development and application of zoonotic risk
technology, and the sharing of data to enable these
processes, are likely to engage critical issues such as
ownership, equity and governance; these issues are con-
sidered central in global health, but relevant scholarship
may not currently interface with existing research on
zoonotic risk prediction.
We explore each of these issues in depth here, and discuss
possible avenues for interdisciplinary work that might help
overcome these barriers, identify conditions precedent to
their use and flag potential limitations.2. How zoonotic risk technology works
At its core, zoonotic risk technology exploits the assumption
that viruses with undetected zoonotic potential are more
similar to known zoonoses than to non-zoonotic viruses.
Early efforts have focused on identifying coarse traits that
are common among known zoonoses, such as origins in par-
ticular host clades [11,45,46] or a broad host range [47–49].
These approaches are useful for identifying common profiles
of what a zoonosis ‘looks like’—e.g. a vector-borne single-
stranded RNA virus with a broad host range including
primates—that can be generalized across animal viruses.
One of the only examples of zoonotic risk technology avail-
able for public use, the SpillOver viral risk ranking
platform, uses this approach to rank 887 viruses based on
31 risk factors [50]. These approaches benefit from generality
and interpretability, but can be limited by data availability;
for example, host range is rarely characterized in wildlife
viruses until they are a known threat to human health, and




4Moreover, trait-based assessments may be limited by appar-
ent contradictions in simple patterns. For example, genome
size correlates positively with zoonotic risk [52] but has
been reported as having contradictory effects on transmissibi-
lity [10,12]; replication in the cytoplasm similarly predicts
zoonotic potential [11,53,54], but also predicts reduced trans-
missibility [10]. Each of these has an idiosyncratic effect on
risk assessment, but approaches that gather as many lines
of evidence as possible can aim to minimize the influence
of any given feature to an overall picture of risk.
Genomic data increasingly offer an alternate avenue for
predictive work. Genomes are inherently high-dimensional
data, encoding meaningful information about microbiology
and immunology, and are often the first aspect of a novel
virus to be characterized, months or years before its ecology.
A simple model might be trained on the nucleotide similarity
of viruses compared to known zoonotic threats, while a more
advanced one might also include similarity in genomic com-
position biases [23,28]. This approach has worked well for the
parallel problem of inferring viral origins using genomic fea-
tures that encode coevolutionary signals of host adaptation.
For example, CpG dinucleotide composition can be used to
identify vertebrate viruses [55,56], exploiting a viral adap-
tation that matches genomic composition to the vertebrate
genome in order to evade innate immune responses search-
ing for non-self-genetic material [57,58]. These patterns are
rare and poorly understood today [59], but the subject of sig-
nificant interest. For zoonotic risk, a model is likely to identify
some combination of broadly transferrable coevolutionary
adaptations that allow a virus to cross species barriers more
readily within a broad group (e.g. primates, or vertebrates),
and random genomic patterns that happen to increase their
odds of successful infection of human hosts (which they
may never have encountered in their evolutionary history).
For example, including similarity of viral genomes to
human housekeeping genes and interferon-stimulated genes
appears to measurably improve the prediction of zoonotic
potential [28].
Over time, genomic approaches are likely to move beyond
similarity, and start identifying de novo predictors of viral
compatibility with human cells. A mechanism-agnostic
model may simply collapse genomes into hundreds of com-
putational features, identify a small handful of significant
predictors and generalize these patterns—but can only do
so successfully with sufficient data. For example, massive
clearinghouses of genomic sequences such as GISAID and
the NIAID Influenza Research Database have enabled a
number of models that accurately classify the zoonotic poten-
tial of influenza strains down to the protein level [60,61].
Decomposing viral genomes, and identifying the regions
most relevant to zoonotic emergence, can open new avenues
for advanced modelling that go beyond pattern recognition.
For example, researchers have developed a number of struc-
tural simulations to explore binding affinity between the
spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 and ACE2 receptors in animal
and human cells [62,63], and structural modelling can be
paired with other trait data to better predict the capacity
for various mammal species to transmit SARS-CoV-2 [64].
Similar approaches could be used to identify the zoonotic
potential of other viruses for which surface protein structure
and receptor use has been characterized [65]. These kinds of
approaches are ultimately limited by the comparability
of different structures in both host and pathogen genomes,and may be most predictive when comparing hosts or patho-
gens at lower taxonomic levels (i.e. viral strain up to viral
genus or family).
No matter how sophisticated these approaches become,
they all face the fundamental task of overcoming data limit-
ations [51]. Only a few hundred zoonotic viruses are
known—a sample size that is fundamentally limiting for
inference, even when treated as the positives in a sample of
a few thousand wildlife viruses. Many groups are chronically
understudied, even after zoonotic viruses are discovered (e.g.
the genus Tibrovirus remains poorly characterized despite the
2009 discovery of Bas-Congo virus and the 2015 discoveries
of Ekpoma virus 1 and 2), creating bias in training datasets
that will usually lead models to underestimate the risk
posed by unfamiliar pathogens. Models that rely on simi-
larity alone will particularly struggle with these data
sources, while those that correctly identify underlying mech-
anisms (e.g. viral matching to host genomic composition) will
perform better out-of-sample, though distinguishing the two
can be challenging. Similarly, the genomes of many viruses
are only partially characterized; models can train on specific
regions of the genome, even though targets available from
sequencing data may not be those with the greatest biological
relevance (e.g. a recent model trained on betacoronavirus
RdRp sequences could identify zoonotic viruses with reason-
able accuracy [66]). Genome-based models are also inherently
constrained by the constant evolution of new viral lineages
[19,67]; while influenza sequence data are abundant enough
to make protein-based models that are somewhat insensitive
to this problem [61], other situations—such as the emergence
of a novel recombinant canine coronavirus (alphacoronavirus
1) that can infect humans—are harder to anticipate [68].
Beyond genomic features, ecological data on viruses are often
even more limited; for example, metadata on host range—a
key predictor in many previous zoonotic risk studies—is
even more underdeveloped, with 20–40% of associations miss-
ing in even the smallest, best-sampled networks [69]. A recent
study showed that graph embeddings of the host–virus net-
work could improve the performance of a genomic model of
viral zoonotic potential—adding high-dimensional data to a
model otherwise limited to a few hundred points—but using
an imputed host–virus network even further improved predic-
tions by overcoming gaps in viral host range data [70]. As these
examples highlight, data limitations are likely to change as
viruses are discovered at an increasing rate. Still, in the interim,
experts will continue developing unique solutions to facing
data sparsity that will advance both the basic biology and
the computational tools of machine learning.
It is difficult to definewhat zoonotic risk technologymight
look likewithin the next 10 years. Asmodels predicting zoono-
tic potential become more advanced, it may be increasingly
possible to also address epidemic potential—one recent
example was able to identify transmissible human viruses
with greater than 80% accuracy [10], while others have
nodded towards the possibility that mortality might also be
predictable [29,31]—and to use machine learning more fully
for comprehensive risk assessment. This nascent field of
research is likely to grow exponentially as post-pandemic
investments transform both the available data describing the
global virome and the institutional support for modelling
research and development (and associated training in higher
education). Especially if this work focuses on improvement




5and modellers, we anticipate that the predictive accuracy and
reliability of these technologies will continue to grow. Pre-
vious work, especially from virologists, has been sceptical
that these approaches might become a reliable source of infer-
ence [51,67]; however, prior work anticipating the level of
predictive resolution that exists today has also historically
been subjected to similar scepticism. Moving past these con-
cerns may require a transition from primarily computational
(sometimes mechanism-agnostic) models—which can per-
form well at any given task, but may be harder to interpret
through different disciplinary lenses—and towards a deeper
conceptual synthesis of virology and computational biology,
focused on identifying the rules of life that underpin host–
virus interactions through a computational lens. As models
become powered by growing datasets cataloguing the global
virome [2,71–75], and more complex microbiological predic-
tors that capture more granular host–virus interactions, it is
difficult to imagine today how accurate and valuable they
might become. If their potential for global health manifests,
we should prepare now to guard against potential misuse,
including monopolization in high-income countries, and to
anticipate important matters of equity, including the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from their use. 3583. Connecting computational and empirical work
Zoonotic risk technology can suggest which viruses may have
zoonotic potential, with a non-trivial degree of uncertainty,
but further confirming that risk requires laboratory character-
ization. For example, successful viral replication in humans
requires tens to hundreds of protein–protein interactions,
which may not be predicted from viral sequence data alone
and require laboratory characterization [76–78]. Conversely,
one of the greatest strengths of these tools is their ability to
narrow down the list of (potentially millions of) viruses for
risk assessment procedures that require complicated, some-
times-expensive experiments. For example, experimental
evaluation of host competency may require establishment of
cell lines from new species [79] or non-model organism sys-
tems in the laboratory with a suite of associated challenges
including unique housing requirements, low fecundity, a
lack of commercial availability, few species-specific laboratory
reagents and often scant baseline data upon which to support
health evaluations. Focusing on establishing these systems for
the wildlife viruses with the highest predicted risk could be a
way to direct effort and minimize costs, particularly if model-
to-validation steps are built in that can validate the underlying
biological reasoning (e.g. predicting cell entry based on recep-
tor sequences followed by high-throughput functional testing
[80]). Conversely, experimental work will point to new needs
in model development (e.g. when cell line experiments
identify previously uncharacterized receptors, these can be
incorporated back into the modelling process).
This aspect of zoonotic risk assessment can be complicated
by concerns that this might require gain-of-function exper-
iments, which use genetic editing or forced adaptation
experiments to induce newphenotypes, potentially expanding
the host range, pathogenesis or mode of transmission of a
pathogen [81]. While these experiments have been critical to
previous work—for example, by demonstrating the epidemic
potential of highly pathogenic avian influenza through
directed mutagenesis and serial passage to recover a viruscapable of airborne transmission [82,83], or by demonstrating
the potential of SARS-like viruses to jump from bat reservoirs
into human populations [84]—they also face tremendous scru-
tiny, given potential or perceived biosafety and biosecurity
risks, including those potentially arising from dual-use
research of concern [85]. (Importantly, most host–virus inter-
action research—including in vitro and in vivo experimental
infections—are not actually ‘gain-of-function’ experiments,
but may also be mislabelled or misidentified as such by the
public or media.) These concerns are likely to face even greater
scrutiny given public conversations about SARS-CoV-2’s as-
yet-unknown origins and the emergence of unsubstantiated
origin theories centred around biosecurity lapses [86].
There are a tremendous diversity of experimental
approaches stopping short of gain-of-function experiments
that can be used to validate predictive models and offer a
more operationalized view of the problem. Among these are
experimental infections to test the ability for cell entry and
receptor usage, replication, pathogenesis, evasion of host
immune responses, assembly and egress, and onward trans-
mission [80,87]. While experimental infections of live animal
models [88] or captive wildlife colonies are often critical to
answer these questions, a number of in vitro approaches
could also be used more extensively in partnership with
model-driven work. In vitro laboratory models, including
cell lines or organoids, may facilitate identification of host
receptors required for viral entry or key immunological factors
that influence viral replication in the reservoir host [89].
Replication incompetent pseudovirus particles and self-
replicating, non-infectious viral replicon systems allow
researchers to characterize specific host–virus molecular inter-
actions in in vitro systems, or test the efficacy of therapeutic
interventions, without the need for the elevated biocontain-
ment measures that may accompany the use of the live
virus. Each of these laboratory approaches can offer targeted
methods to validate predictions from machine learning
models, such as virus–human compatibility, ability for viral
replication and productive infection, and disease pathology,
tissue tropism or courses of infection. Many of these methods
can be used without the requirement for high-containment
laboratories, which is particularly important to ensure that a
wide variety of different viral groups can be studied safely
yet at scale and across country contexts.
Experimental work can further help identify the (model-
lable) molecular barriers to zoonotic emergence. Each stage
in the viral life cycle represents an opportunity to improve
model performance, but will require the gathering and recon-
ciliation of data across multiple host–virus systems and
experimental approaches. For example, laboratory exper-
iments are likely to vastly improve model performance
upstream by offering new kinds of predictor data that reflect
the various types of host responses to infection. These may
include broad comparative data on host transcriptomic or
proteomic responses to infection [90], or host–virus protein–
protein interactions [77], which may help identify the mech-
anisms of infection and pathogenesis in humans even when
collected from animal model systems [90]. Through better col-
laboration among statistical modellers and empiricists, future
development of zoonotic risk technologies can iteratively
validate or falsify model predictions, helping to improve
the accuracy and applicability of predictive models over
time. While some modelling publications may, therefore,
recommend further characterization of specific viruses, this
roya
6will be unlikely to occur without active partnership between
modellers and experimentalists, given that the priority is
often placed on known and recurrent threats. lsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
376:202003584. Theory to technology, technology to toolkit
Most zoonotic risk technology is developed with the stated
intent to contribute positively to human health and reduce
the future burden of emerging zoonotic viruses. However,
the knowledge that a virus poses a threat to human health
often exists for years, even decades, before a catastrophic out-
break [33]. Zoonotic risk technology may, therefore, have
limited benefit to global health without careful, intentional
work focused on application and actionability. The pipeline
from technology development, to implementation, to risk
mitigation is likely to only succeed at first in specific,
narrow use cases.
First, and most foundationally, predictive modelling work
will always be disconnected from global health if the endpoint
is in the academic literature. This is particularly the case if
research groups are separated geographically and practically
from the direct impacts of potential spillover events, and
choose not to pursue collaboration and knowledge exchange
with local experts, limiting both the expertise available to
properly design and contextualize work, and the channels
available for possible dissemination and outreach. Similar
challenges have been identified for related modelling pro-
blems, like the development and deployment of early
warning systems or real-time epidemic forecasting [91,92].
Engaging practitioners, policymakers and stakeholders in
the participatory design, release and ongoing improvement
of infrastructure is likely to increase the value of zoonotic
risk technology, as will designing open tools with public inter-
faces (open-source software or Websites, e.g. FluLeap:
https://fluleap.bic.nus.edu.sg/) and based on open, inter-
pretable data. These tools should be adaptable in order to
more accurately reflect scientific advances, as well as changing
user needs, over time. They must report appropriate, inter-
pretable and locally relevant metrics of risk to inform
decision-making, with uncertainty presented as transparently
as possible, includingwhere uncertainty comes from (e.g. data
limitations versus model calibration) and how uncertainty
correlates with the outcome variables. Scientists may also be
called on to develop a new language for conveying context-
dependent risk and communicating uncertainty to different
audiences, including properly disclaiming results such that
public, private or health sector responses neither over-react
to high-risk predictions nor under-react to low-risk predic-
tions. This enduring challenge extends into many other
aspects of global health and disease ecology.
At least in the near term, it is unlikely that any specific,
coordinated and effective response will be mobilized based
solely on the identification of a novel virus with zoonotic
potential. Resource scarcity prevents the development of
individual surveillance systems or biomedical research-and-
development programmes for each of the thousands of
wildlife viruses with zoonotic potential; existing programmes
focused on the narrowest set of expert-assessed high-risk
threats (e.g. influenza A viruses, betacoronaviruses or henipa-
viruses) are already over-encumbered. These programmes
may, however, benefit from technology that identifies
zoonosis-relevant evolutionary shifts in viruses circulatingin wildlife (e.g. the emergence of a Nipah virus lineage
with greater estimated transmissibility, a long-standing
concern in some biosecurity circles [93]).
More broadly, these tools may find applications in existing
One Health surveillance programmes focused on high-risk
interfaces between wildlife, domestic and captive animals,
and humans. Zoonotic risk technology is likely to be most
actionable at small scales: a local inventory of wildlife viruses
can be ranked according to risk, frequency and degree
of human–animal contact, with the highest-risk viruses incor-
porated back into local surveillance priorities. For studies
reporting the discovery of novel animal viruses, this step can
be simple as an additional analysis, with at least one published
example of this use case [94]. However, if studies are designed
with these kinds of assessments inmind, theymay also be able
to collect additional datawith tremendous value. For example,
sequence-based viral discovery often focuses only on viral
reads and discards data from the host [95]. The host-derived
sequence data contain crucial information about the host
response that could provide insight into a given virus’ patho-
genic potential in an animal or human host, allowing for
further surveillance prioritization of both host and virus
species. The use of these studies is also limited by the
quality of data shared in the public domain: sharing of
standardized and validated data such as host species identifi-
cation, location, specimen type and date of collection in a
centralised resource, rather than lost in a publication (if at
all), is one of the first steps to a truly collaborative approach.
Once high-risk viruses are identified and reported in wild-
life monitoring studies, these pathogensmay also be identified
and flagged earlier in samples collected by programmes that
passively monitor the health of high-risk human populations
(e.g. livestock keepers or wildlife traders) and sentinel hosts
like livestock, or actively screen human populations for
novel pathogens by investigating undiagnosed febrile illnesses
[96–99]. Behavioural change or occupational safety interven-
tions may then be targeted to reduce spillover risk for high-
risk human populations, though they may be most feasible
or successful if they target risky exposure to specific host
species with multiple high-risk viruses and frequent human
contact (especially if they already match local priorities),
thereby protecting against their entire zoonotic virome. For
example, while Nipah virus is the highest-priority zoonotic
threat hosted by the Indian fruit bat (Pteropus medius), inter-
ventions that reduce Nipah exposure in humans may also
protect against the other 50+ viruses that these bats host
[100]. Similarly, the reservoir for Lassa virus carries a
number of other bacterial zoonoses, and rodent control can
reduce transmission risk across this range of threats [101].
While many of these reservoirs are known today from their
role in pathogen spillover, a number of other high-risk species
are presumably unknown; building on previous work that
characterizes zoonotic risk using ecological traits correlated
with ‘hyperreservoirs’ [25], future research may include char-
acterizing these species’ viromes, and estimating the risk that
they pose in aggregate.5. Failure to equitably share benefits may limit
impact
As the failure to ensure global access to diagnostics, thera-
peutics and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic has
Box 1. Crediting researchers for re-used, open sequence data.
When ‘big data’ becomes available at scales that allow machine learning (or other intensive secondary analysis), the research-
ers who compiled the data often receive exponentially diminishing credit through academic incentives. Existing public data
repositories, including GISAID and NCBI GenBank, have no indexable source attribution for sequence data. GISAID requires
acknowledgement of the source, but such acknowledgement is not a trackable metric contributing to career development;
similarly, GenBank accession numbers assist in the reproducibility of analyses, but are not indexed, and cannot be easily
tracked by contributors as a career metric. This can disincentivize open data sharing if it is seen as a ‘non-promotable’
task for those generating the data, given that other indexed metrics like citations may be used to determine scientific
impact when evaluating funding proposals or in hiring and promotion decisions.
Moreover, this system currently benefits users of public data repositories more than those who generate the data. In several
instances during the COVID-19 pandemic, laboratories generating SARS-CoV-2 sequence data have been stretched thin with
pandemic response and were unable to annotate, analyse and publish on their data before computational or academic labora-
tories used the data in their own publications. Similar practices are particularly divisivewhen researchers use data generated by
public health laboratories in developing nations without co-authorship, collaboration or indexed citation of the source.
One potential solution would be an indexed DOI for sequence data; similar approaches are used for aggregate data in
biodiversity research (e.g. by the Global Biodiversity Informatics Facility; gbif.org), and while many studies fail to follow rec-





demonstrated [102], the distribution of the benefits from
health technologies, particularly novel technologies, is inequi-
table and a global injustice. Global health must not simply
aspire to principles of health equity and social justice, but
must also make equitable access to life-saving technologies a
condition precedent to their development and use. This
must be a priority in the development and use of zoonotic
risk technology, which may also pose a unique set of problems
for both researchers and practitioners. These technologies
depend on open data sharing, both to create sufficient training
sets for artificial intelligence and to actually apply them for
risk assessment and subsequent mitigation. Community
efforts to share human and animal sequence data at sufficient
scales (i.e. to generate feature sets for advancedmachine learn-
ing) exist for just a handful of high-profile viruses, nearly
exclusively as part of international coordination on pandemic
preparedness and response (e.g. influenza A and SARS-CoV-2
data sharing via the GISAID platform), while all-purpose
repositories like GenBank still only capture a fraction of
known viruses (as many are bottlenecked by taxonomic ratifi-
cation), and lack essential metadata needed for prediction.
Both face challenges with regard to contributors receiving
credit and attribution for research (especially modelling
studies) based on the data they submit (box 1).
These problems become more complex with regard to the
deployment of zoonotic risk technology itself. Initially, there
may be resistance to using these tools: scientists who gather
novel sequence data may rightfully be hesitant to upload
unpublished data to online Web tools for zoonotic risk pre-
diction without clear and enforceable protections against
data reuse by the curators of such tools, even if these tools
are curated by a trusted third-party (though access to this
technology may inherently change power dynamics). This
is only one concern out of a broader set of issues around
access and benefit sharing for viral surveillance. Based in
countries’ sovereign rights to determine the use of resources
within their territory, access and benefit-sharing regimes
seek to redress and prevent injustices arising from the exploi-
tation of genetic resources, and from the inequitable sharing
of the benefits that arise from their use. Some protections
and norms around the sharing of physical pathogen samples
and the benefits arising from their use are reflected under theNagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilization (Nagoya Protocol) to the Convention on Biological
Diversity. Under the Nagoya Protocol, countries may
implement domestic legislation that requires foreign research-
ers seeking access to pathogen samples, or in some cases even
data related to those samples, to obtain the country’s prior
informed consent and the conclusion of mutually agreed
terms that include benefit sharing, such as attribution in pub-
lications, capacity building, technology transfer or intellectual
property rights. Depending on the terms agreed, the use of
genetic sequence data derived from pathogen samples may
be restricted, including both preventing the sharing of
sequence data in open access databases, requiring open shar-
ing or the sharing of any diagnostic tools developed using the
sequence data.
Given that a growing number of laboratories are readily
able to synthesize viruses from their genome sequences
(e.g. horsepox [103] and SARS-CoV-2 [104]), there are con-
cerns that the bargain underpinning access and benefit-
sharing regimes provided by physical samples—like those
established in the Nagoya Protocol—may be in flux. If zoono-
tic risk technologies allow researchers to identify high-risk
viruses with reasonable certainty before laboratory character-
ization, this could add an additional layer of complexity.
Sequence sharing and synthesis of SARS-CoV-2, in addition
to the global failure to equitably distribute associated vac-
cines, diagnostics and therapeutics, may motivate attempts
to expressly address these gaps in international legal instru-
ments. These could include, for example, potential revision
to the International Health Regulations (2005) or the
Nagoya Protocol, or new international law, such as a Pan-
demic Treaty. Any international governance reform should
actively consider the importance, on equal footing, of open
data sharing and the equitable sharing of the benefits of
novel technologies like zoonotic risk technology.
Even if zoonotic risk technologies are easily applied with-
out challenges around sequence data sharing, there may be
gaps between intentions and actionable science. When high-
risk viruses are identified, findings may be kept private
until they are published much later in peer-reviewed journals,




8accommodate governments’ hesitancy to release information
that could create fear or stigmatization. This could reinforce
the disconnect between viral sampling and actionable science
for global public health. At present, announcements about
the discovery of notable animal viruses are often made
ad hoc either by press release or conventional publishing
methods. If zoonotic risk technology becomes a widely
adopted part of surveillance, new governance processes will
probably need to be developed that protect researchers’
careers and credit, but also ensure that announcements are
transparent and verifiable, particularly if alarming or unusual
results (e.g. the hypothetical discovery of a filovirus with zoo-
notic potential in bats in the USA) are likely to motivate
public or international concern.
Another set of issues could arise around who benefits
from zoonotic risk technology. It seems plausible that these
technologies might mostly benefit from the research effort
and data sharing occurring in tropical countries, where zoo-
notic viral diversity is believed to be highest [11]. However,
their development might mostly further the careers of
researchers in high-income countries in North America
and Europe, particularly if developed by experts who are
unattuned to power dynamics in global health. Equally con-
cerning, we identify a possibility that these tools will largely
be developed as proprietary ‘risk assessment algorithms’ by
corporate ‘data science for impact’ programmes, for-profit
global health firms and non-profit organizations, just as
they have been for the development of pandemic insurance
programmes or similar analytics. In these circumstances,
and without appropriate governance, the countries with the
highest burden of zoonotic emergence might find their own
data (repackaged in an analytic format) sold back to them
at a premium by scientists and corporations from high-
income countries. Open sharing of academic research could
help scientists undermine this trend and provide tools
directly to end users in public health, or assist them in devel-
oping their own tools, but may simply accelerate advances in
zoonotic risk technology without changing the existing colo-
nial framework of global health. Involving researchers from
low- and middle-income countries—and supporting their
leadership in this field (particularly, to a greater extent, in
future workshops on this topic, which could advance this
issue further than the present workshop did)—will help
limit these shortfalls. This can be particularly facilitated by
using virtual workshops (with attention to different accessi-
bility challenges) and by supporting in-person workshops
around the world, and by coordinating participation proac-
tively through existing zoonotic disease and laboratory
networks (e.g. SEAOHUN, OHCEA or the CREID centre net-
work). Involving researchers from the discipline of science
and technology studies may also lead to a more honest and
critical appraisal of the ethical issues surrounding the
emerging technology, and who it benefits or harms.
Finally, we anticipate that zoonotic risk technology may
replicate existing, and potentially create new, ethics and gov-
ernance problems in synthetic biology. Just as convolutional
neural networks and other kinds of artificial intelligence
can be used to fabricate realistic images entirely through
predictive algorithms (e.g. thispersondoesnotexist.com),
zoonotic risk technology might be used to generate novel
viral sequences (and potentially synthetic viruses) with high
predicted zoonotic and epidemic potential. Already, research-
ers have used these approaches to simulate alternatecoronavirus spike protein sequences that might be able to
infect human cells [105]. These approaches might support bio-
medical work; for example, synthetic spike proteins could be
used to test a candidate universal betacoronavirus vaccine
for its value across ‘unsampled evolutionary space’. However,
if biomedical companies attempt to patent these sequences,
they could create new problems for future sample sharing,
therapeutic and vaccine development, or outbreak response
if viruses with the relevant sequence someday emerge—
potentially at the expense of some countries more than
others. While similar issues have been raised before during
zoonotic outbreaks [106], the novelty of simulated zoonoses
might create new complications for intellectual property law.
Moreover, viral ranking algorithms or artificially simulated
virus sequences might also be used by a malicious actor, high-
lighting the need to involve scholarship from the ‘dual use’
field of bioethics.6. Prediction is not prevention
Zoonotic risk technology may become an asset in the emer-
ging disease toolkit, but overselling this technology or
understating uncertainty will lead to preventable divergences
between expectations and scientific possibility. Models may
ultimately have profound clinical and field applications, but
the uncertainty around risk estimates and likelihood of inac-
curate predictions must be carefully communicated. As part
of that, epistemic differences in disciplinary conceptions of
uncertainty may need to be bridged: for example, a model
may make ‘errors’ simply because reality is a stochastic obser-
vation of underlying risk landscapes, and a technology that
correctly infers probabilities or risk landscapes will still
never perfectly represent reality. (These may play into other
disciplinary tensions about what ‘prediction’ means: to
public health experts and the public, prediction is often synon-
ymous with anticipating future events, but to computational
biologists, it maymore often be used to describe accurate infer-
ence about biological possibility.) Further, there is no
substitute for experimental work, and bench virology will
play a critical role to generate the necessary data for model
development and validation. Zoonotic risk technology is
also no substitute for general public health preparedness;
even though these tools could be used in the future to estimate
the risk posed by newly discovered viruses as soon as the first
genome becomes available, many viruses are still likely to con-
tinue to enter human populations before they have been
characterized in animals. Whether these outbreaks become
epidemics or pandemics is a problem outside the scope of
the technologies we discuss.
Therefore, wewarn that investments in research and devel-
opment on topics like machine learning or animal virus
genomics must not come at the expense of other essential
kinds of modelling work (e.g. work focused on virus trans-
mission and spread, or identifying the most consequential
surveillance gaps), or more importantly, at the expense of
non-technological investments in health systems strengthen-
ing, including attainment of universal health coverage, and
similar aspects of pandemic preparedness. Similarly, it is poss-
ible that interest in pre-emergence zoonotic viruses might
conflict with, redirect, or undermine local priorities like water
and food-borne diseases (and sanitation), agricultural, high-




9andmalaria) or non-communicable diseases; interventions may
even disrupt local interests and norms, potentially weakening
outbreak response during emergencies. If the post-pandemic
period becomes dominated by this narrow subset of research
priorities, researchers will need to be individually careful in
order to accurately and fairly present the value and importance
of theirwork (an imperative thatwill be encouraged byefforts to
reduce funding scarcity in this space).
At the same time, it is indisputable that zoonotic risk
technology is currently limited in both development and
application by data scarcity, and that the only solution to
this is continued or greater investment in data collection—par-
ticularly in basic science. Post-pandemic investment in
coordinated programmes for viral discovery, One Health sur-
veillance, bench virology and other kinds of laboratory
capacity are all likely to generate vital data that can improve
the performance of these technologies, and remedy critical
gaps in our current understanding of the global virome.
These will be most effective if investments are maximized in
the hotspots of zoonotic emergence, if modellers are engaged
in the process to support data collection and processing in
reusable formats, and—perhaps most importantly—if these
investments aremadewith the aim of improving outbreak pre-
vention and preparedness entirely independent of the success
or failure of zoonotic risk prediction as a scientific outcome.
Finally, we suggest that ongoing work is required to
benchmark the accuracy and value of these technologies,
that transparency and uncertainty be key facets of their pres-
entation and most importantly that the scientific community
remains prepared for ‘surprises’. (In a strikingly timely
example, only days before the submission of this manuscript,
the first-ever report of human infections with H5N8 avian
influenza A virus was released—a strain that was, surpris-
ingly enough, able to be correctly identified as human by a
previously published model that had never encountered a
zoonotic H5N8 virus in the training data [107].) Models are
only as powerful as the data that inform them, and with
such a small percentage of the global virome described to
date—and new viruses evolving constantly—it seems likely
that the next generation of risk prediction systems, and
public health infrastructure that may come to rely on them,
will face a number of entirely unexpected threats.7. Conclusion
At present, efforts to predict ‘Disease X’—an unknown threat
that could someday reach humans—rely on a mix of expert
opinion and laboratory virology. In the coming years,
researchers may increasingly be able to rely on statistical
inference and artificial intelligence as another line of evi-
dence. The availability of these tools might make wildlife
disease surveillance programmes more impactful, and
better connect their work to outbreak prevention, but only
if the many barriers to actionable science are identified and
addressed proactively. The first and most foundational step
is building a global community of open science that pursues
collaborative, interdisciplinary and impactful work at the
nexus of virology, computational biology and global health.
Building that community will have benefits far beyond the
narrow problem of zoonotic risk technology, and will make
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